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E
merging from the worst harvest 
in a decade, the Government of 
Malawi implemented one of the 
most ambitious and successful assaults 
on hunger in the history of the African 
continent. Through a national input 
subsidy program, coinciding with better 
rainfall conditions, maize production 
doubled in 2006 and almost tripled in 
2007. From a 43% national food deficit 
in 2005, Malawi achieved a 53% surplus 
in 2007, some of which was exported to 
neighboring countries. An associated 
decline in the price of maize conveys 
important benefits to low-income urban 
and rural households that are net food 
consumers. Malawi’s recent experience 
may provide important lessons for 
achieving food security through 
smallholders in Africa.
Agricultural productivity 
improvements have long been viewed as 
the foundation for economic prosperity 
and social development [1–3]. Asia’s 
Green Revolution began in the 1960s 
with the development of fertilizer-
responsive, high-yielding varieties of 
rice and wheat [4]. Global average 
yields of these staple crops more than 
doubled over this period with greatest 
impact in regions with irrigation or 
more reliable rainfall. Improved access 
to fertilizer through state-supported 
subsidies, rural credit, and improved 
infrastructure contributed to strong 
productivity growth in both crops. 
Asian governments also supported the 
uptake of new technology through 
research and extension, and intervened 
in the market though price support 
[5,6].
In contrast, agricultural productivity 
growth in sub-Saharan Africa has not 
kept pace with population growth. The 
per capita growth rate of agricultural 
gross domestic product was negative 
during the 1980s and 1990s, though 
improvements have been noted since 
2000 [6]. Production growth of the 
major African food crops (maize and 
root crops) was based almost entirely 
on extending the cultivated area, 
with only minor contributions from 
yield growth [4]. Poor infrastructure 
and related high transport costs (for 
both inputs and surplus production), 
inadequate institutional support (credit 
and extension), political instability, 
diverse agroecological complexities, 
low fertilizer use, and the limited 
availability of suitable high-yielding 
varieties have all contributed to low 
agricultural productivity growth in 
Africa [4–6].
The slower productivity growth 
in Africa compared with Asia masks 
a number of limited successes that 
could point to a latent African Green 
Revolution. Recognizing the role of 
agriculture in stimulating economic 
growth and reducing rural poverty, 
African governments promoted 
fertilizer use during the 1970s and early 
1980s [7] through several interventions, 
including direct subsidies that 
reduced fertilizer prices for farmers, 
government-financed and -managed 
input credit programs, centralized 
fertilizer procurement and distribution, 
and control of output markets. 
Impressive improvements in maize 
productivity were demonstrated in 
Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Zambia during 
the 1980s [8]. Cereal crop output in 
Ethiopia has dramatically increased 
over the past decade [9]. Several other 
studies have shown the potential of 
input subsidies in accelerating crop 
production [10–12]. However, these 
positive results were generally not 
sustained with the advent of donor-
driven structural adjustment and the 
dismantling of government-supported 
institutions and subsidies.
By the turn of the century, fertilizer 
use in Africa was only 8 kg/ha, 
compared with 96 kg/ha in East and 
Southeast Asia and 101 kg/ha in 
South Asia [7]. Today, Africa accounts 
for less than 1% of global fertilizer 
consumption. A World Bank synthesis 
of lessons learned from earlier efforts 
to promote fertilizer use on the 
continent [7] attributed this failure 
to high and unsustainable fiscal and 
administrative costs, governments’ weak 
capacity to implement programs, and 
governments’ inability to take account 
of the diversity of production systems 
and farmers’ needs.
Donors, led by the World Bank, 
argued for the abolition of state-led 
interventions including subsidies. As a 
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result, many government input supply 
agencies were dissolved or privatized. 
Under these circumstances, fertilizer 
costs rose sharply and constrained 
adoption of fertilizer use by small-
scale farmers. The World Bank study 
concluded that “although these 
reforms had generated positive impacts 
on government budgets, they resulted 
in significant reductions in overall 
levels of fertilizer use and increased 
food insecurity among many rural 
households” [7, p. 4]. This policy 
failure caused a serious reassessment 
among governments, creating the 
setting for a return to subsidies as a 
potential intervention for promoting 
food security and agricultural growth.
Against the broader continent-wide 
trend, fertilizer use by smallholder 
farmers in Kenya has increased 
dramatically since the early 1990s 
[7]. This apparent anomaly has been 
attributed to four main factors: stable 
fertilizer market policies leading to 
rapid expansion of private fertilizer 
distribution networks; reduction 
in the average distance between 
farmers and fertilizer retailers; greater 
competition among importers and 
wholesalers; and high profitability of 
Kenya’s horticulture industry leading 
to maize-horticulture intercrops [7]. 
However, this country-level impact 
of market liberalization remains 
concentrated in more favorable and 
wealthier regions of the country where 
farmers earn sufficient cash from other 
enterprises, such as horticulture and 
dairy farming, to buy maize fertilizer. In 
one of Kenya’s poorest and most food-
insecure regions, the western lowlands, 
87% of smallholders use no fertilizer 
on maize [13]. While generally 
praising Kenya’s progress in fertilizer 
market liberalization, a recent study 
of fertilizer policies and use in Kenya 
[13] acknowledged the fragility of the 
Kenyan success story and concluded: 
“Because mean household incomes are 
higher in Kenya compared with many 
other African countries, the impressive 
market-led growth in smallholder 
fertilizer use in Kenya may not be easily 
transferable to areas where effective 
demand is highly constrained” [13, p. 
39].
In Malawi, recent success with 
input subsidies highlights how pro-
poor public investments in maize 
productivity improvement can be made 
cost-effectively. This essay examines the 
circumstances, results, and implications 
from the 2005–2006 and 2006–2007 
national input subsidy programs, and 
describes the experience of more 
intensive support undertaken by the 
Millennium Villages Project (MVP) in 
one district of southern Malawi.
Smallholder Maize Production in 
Malawi
Malawi is a landlocked tropical country 
of more than 13 million people. Its 
economy is heavily dependent on 
agriculture, which employs 78% of 
the national labor force [14]. Maize is 
grown by 97% of farming households 
and accounts for 60% of total calorie 
consumption. Almost all maize is grown 
without irrigation during the single 
rainy season from October to April, 
which is subject to rainfall variability 
that can be particularly damaging 
when short dry spells occur during the 
critical flowering and early grain filling 
stages [15].
Decades of intensive cultivation 
by smallholders, in the absence of 
significant fertilizer use, have depleted 
soils of nutrients, particularly nitrogen 
[16,17]. National yields of maize have 
averaged 1.3 metric tons per hectare 
(t/ha) during the last 20 years [9]. In 
contrast, the average yield of rainfed 
maize in Iowa in the United States 
(1997–2007) exceeded 10 t/ha
[18].Over half of Malawi’s farming 
households operate below subsistence. 
Because of low productivity and small 
farm size, only 20% of maize farmers 
produce surplus and sell their product. 
On-farm storage losses are high. As a 
result, most households purchase maize 
at much higher prices when stocks are 
exhausted, typically during January to 
March [14].
To cope with food deficits, 
households reduce daily maize 
consumption, increase consumption 
of alternative calorie sources (such 
as cassava), sell assets (such as 
Box 1: OPVs versus Hybrids
In Malawi and throughout Africa, there is debate about the relative merits of 
OPVs and hybrid varieties of maize [45]. Smallholder maize production in Africa has 
traditionally been based on the use of OPVs, whereby the seed is retained from year to 
year. Over time, through farmer selection, these traditional OPVs, known as landraces, 
become well adapted to the particular farm environment. Improved OPVs have been 
bred and selected for special characteristics such as drought tolerance and disease 
resistance. Seed can be recycled by farmers for a maximum of three years without 
significant yield loss. OPVs typically yield 10%–25% less than hybrids [45].
Hybrid maize is produced by crossing two genetically unrelated inbred parents. The 
resulting seed exhibits hybrid vigor, but recycled hybrid seed will not breed true in 
subsequent generations, and can result in yield losses of 30% or more, reducing and 
perhaps eliminating any yield advantage in subsequent planting [45]. Hybrids are more 
uniform and generally higher yielding than OPVs. The Government of Malawi launched 
a hybrid breeding program in 1950, following a severe drought in 1949 [46]. The first 
hybrids were released in 1958 and by the 1990s were adopted by about a quarter of 
Malawi’s smallholders. Research indicated a consistent yield advantage of hybrids over 
local maize varieties at all levels of fertilizer use, including in a drought year [22,47]. 
This yield advantage of hybrids remained even under low soil fertility and drought 
conditions.
On balance, the yield advantage of hybrids appears robust for smallholder maize 
production in Malawi. However, the choice of hybrids versus OPVs is constrained by 
a complex set of factors including the higher seed cost and the often poorer storage 
and processing characteristics of hybrids [47]. During the second year of the Malawi 
input subsidy program, voucher recipients were given a choice of OPV or hybrids: 2 kg 
of hybrid seed or 3 kg improved OPV, depending on supplier costs. Based on coupon 
redemption, 76% of farmers chose hybrids over OPVs [29]. Thus, in Malawi, there is 
clearly a strong farmer preference for hybrids over improved OPVs provided that the 
prices of seed and fertilizer are subsidized. 
Hybrid seed is generally more expensive than OPVs because of the higher cost of 
seed production and private sector control over supplies. Farmers in lower potential 
environments often find it difficult to recover the costs of hybrid seed and fertilizer. In 
the absence of deep subsidies to both seed and fertilizer, risk perceptions of small-scale 
farmers, especially in low potential rainfed environments, have been shown to constrain 
adoption of hybrid maize [47,48].PLoS Biology  |  www.plosbiology.org 0004 January 2009  |  Volume 7  |  Issue 1  |  e1000023
livestock), and seek employment on 
large commercial estates or in towns 
[14]. Theft of crops in the field is 
common during severe food shortages, 
prompting farmers to harvest 
unripe green maize for immediate 
consumption. Food insecurity also 
encourages unsafe sexual practices 
leading to higher incidence of HIV/
AIDS, other sexually transmitted 
diseases, teenage pregnancies, and 
abortions [19]. Gender and theft-
related violence increase. And school 
attendance usually drops during times 
of food shortage.
These dire circumstances underscore 
the urgent need to improve 
smallholder maize productivity through 
an African Green Revolution [20]. 
The technology and the knowledge 
to improve maize yields in Malawi 
have existed for at least three decades 
[21,22]. The challenge, identified 
in July 2004 by then United Nations 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, is to 
“turn this knowledge into practice” 
and thereby “take the first steps out of 
chronic poverty” [20, p. 19].
2005 Food Emergency Leads to a 
Bold Policy Decision
The 2004–2005 maize season (planted 
October–December 2004 and 
harvested April–June 2005) was the 
worst in a decade (Figure 1). Many 
parts of the country went without 
rain for up to one month during 
January and February—the critical 
tasseling and ear development stages 
for maize—with a devastating effect 
on yields: the national average was 
only 0.76 t/ha, 40% below the long-
term average. Total maize production 
for 2004–2005 was 24% less than the 
previous year, amounting to 57% of 
the estimated national maize food 
requirement [9].
In May 2005, the Malawi 
Vulnerability Assessment Committee 
concluded that over 4.2 million people 
required food aid [23]. The food 
situation was deteriorating rapidly, and 
a major humanitarian relief operation 
began [24]. By November 2005, as 
the maize prices in local markets 
continued to rise, the estimate went up 
to 5 million Malawians—38% of the 
population—in need of food aid [15]. 
In response to recurring food 
deficits, the Government decided to 
invest in subsidizing agricultural inputs, 
an approach that was being vigorously 
promoted by the UN Millennium 
Project [25]. This policy attracted 
objections from some major donors 
[26] who were concerned about the 
potential cost and the absence of a 
clear exit strategy. Those same donors 
had earlier supported a Starter Pack 
program in 1998–1999 and 1999–2000 
whereby small packages of fertilizer, 
maize seed, and legume seed, sufficient 
for 0.1 ha, were distributed free to 
almost all maize smallholders in 
Malawi [27]. This program led to 
an extra 280,000 to 420,000 t maize 
produced. However, the main donors 
scaled down their support to Starter 
Pack, citing operational weaknesses, 
lack of targeting to the poorest 
households, and the negative impact 
on diversification efforts [28]. The 
sharp reduction in the coverage of 
the program was reflected in national 
production statistics (Figure 1). Malawi 
once again fell below self-sufficiency 
and resumed its dependency on food 
aid [19,27].
In the face of adverse donor 
reactions, and after heated 
parliamentary debate, the Government 
used discretionary budget funds 
and support from the UN to import 
fertilizer and procure improved maize 
seed for distribution to farmers. 
Through the national input subsidy 
program, the Government allocated 
coupons to buy sufficient fertilizer 
to grow maize on one acre (0.4 ha), 
a 4-fold increase in the amount 
provided under Starter Pack, as well 
as 3 kg of maize seed—an insufficient 
amount (10 kg of seed are needed 
for 0.4 ha) necessitated by funding 
constraints. Seed, of a limited number 
of Government-recommended open 
pollinated varieties (OPVs), was sold 
at less than one third of the market 
rate. The total market value of the 
inputs was MK5,500 (US$44.00), of 
which the farmers paid MK2,050 
(US$16.40), representing an overall 
63% subsidy. Coupons were allocated 
across regions and then distributed 
to districts and traditional authorities 
(sub-district government entities), who 
allocated them to Village Development 
Committees, which identified the 
recipients. All of the subsidized 
fertilizer and seed was distributed 
through government agencies [29].
Including late distribution of 
supplementary coupons, 3.4 million 
coupons were issued (73% of these 
were for maize cultivation), of which 
75% were redeemed [29]. A total of 
132,000 t fertilizer (22,000 t of which 
were for tobacco fertilizers) and 6,000 
t of improved maize seed were made 
available. The total cost of the program 
was estimated at MK7.2 billion (US$58 
million), representing the direct 
costs of purchase and distribution of 
fertilizer, net of sales receipts [29]. 
Excluding the cost of tobacco fertilizer, 
the cost of the maize subsidy in 2005–
2006 is estimated at approximately 
US$50 million.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1000023.g001
Figure 1. National Maize Production and Maize Food Requirement over 25 Years 
Compiled from [9,49]. Unusual dips and spikes in maize requirement are a reflection of 
inconsistency in methods of national population determination.PLoS Biology  |  www.plosbiology.org 0005 January 2009  |  Volume 7  |  Issue 1  |  e1000023
There was no explicit targeting 
of subsidies toward the poor, who 
represented 54% of the population in 
2005 [14]. This was another criticism 
from donors and a reason for their slow 
support. However, there was officially a 
maximum allocation of two 50 kg bags 
per household. This upper limit was 
intended to reduce the potential for 
capture of subsidies by larger farmers.
A Bumper Harvest in 2006
The 2005–2006 season had good rains, 
and total maize production was more 
than double the 2004–2005 harvest, 
producing a surplus of 510,000 t 
above the national maize requirement 
(Table 1). Maize yields averaged 
1.59 t/ha, doubling the 0.76 t/ha 
of the drought-affected 2004–2005 
season. Incremental maize production 
attributed to the fertilizer subsidy was 
estimated at 300,000 to 400,000 t [30].
The 2005–2006 growing season 
was clearly more favorable for maize 
production than the drought-affected 
2004–2005 season but was broadly 
comparable to the 2001–2002 and 
2002–2003 seasons, when relatively 
small subsidies were provided. Maize 
production in 2005–2006 was higher 
than in the 2001–2002 and 2002–2003 
seasons by 1.02 million t and 600,000 
t, respectively, suggesting a large 
incremental impact of the subsidy 
beyond the effect of better rainfall.
Encouraged by this achievement, 
the Government continued the subsidy 
program for the 2006–2007 season. 
While donors acknowledged the impact 
of the 2005–2006 subsidy, they argued 
for increasing the participation of the 
private sector, especially the agro-dealer 
network. The Government recognized 
the need to partner with the private 
sector, but expressed concerns in the 
event of unsold government stocks, 
unreliable seed quality, and inability to 
reach the more remote areas that were 
not served by the private sector. After 
the UK Department for International 
Development offered technical and 
financial support, a compromise was 
reached whereby the Government was 
financially buffered against possible 
unsold stocks, input distribution was 
supported by a professional logistics 
unit, and seed and fertilizer quality was 
monitored.
Continued Success in 2007 
For the 2006–2007 season, the input 
subsidy program was repeated on a 
similar scale to 2005–2006. A total 
of 3.5 million coupons for maize 
fertilizer were distributed, targeted 
to maize-growing households, to 
enable purchase of the same amounts 
of fertilizer at the same price as in 
the previous year. Two million seed 
coupons were also distributed, each 
enabling recipients to obtain 3 kg 
of OPV seed or 2 kg hybrid seed, 
depending on the farmers’ choice 
and seed availability. According to 
Government of Malawi estimates 
[29], overall coupon redemption was 
95% for fertilizer and 91% for seed, 
higher than in the previous season. 
The Government met 87% of the 
net subsidy cost. The private sector 
distributed 28% of the fertilizer and 
all of the seed. Seventy-six percent of 
farmers opted for the higher-yielding 
hybrids over the less expensive OPVs 
[29], challenging perceptions among 
some donors and nongovernmental 
organizations that hybrid varieties were 
inappropriate for small-scale farmers 
(Box 1).
The 2006–2007 harvest was estimated 
at 3.44 million t, an all-time national 
record for Malawi, generating a surplus 
of about 1.34 million t of maize grain 
above national requirements (Table 1, 
Figure 1). The incremental effect of the 
fertilizer subsidy on maize production 
was estimated at 670,000 t for 2006–
2007, valued at US$117 million in 
additional crop production, assuming 
a maize producer price of US$175/t. 
The total program cost in 2006–2007 
was US$72 million [29], approximately 
US$62 million of which was directed 
to maize fertilizer and seed costs. 
By late 2007, Malawi had exported 
over 300,000 t of maize to Zimbabwe, 
not only generating income for its 
smallholder farmers, but contributing 
to regional food security [15]. The 
Government decided to continue the 
program in 2007–2008.
The poor harvest of 2004–2005 led to 
a sharp rise in the price of maize sold 
at local markets throughout Malawi 
[15]. By June 2006, with most of the 
2005–2006 crop harvested, the average 
price had dropped by 61%. With the 
effects of the 2006–2007 bumper 
crop, the maize price dropped still 
further. Anecdotal evidence pointed 
to a modest increase in maize prices in 
some markets during August–October 
2007 due to procurement for export 
to Zimbabwe. Since then, global food 
shortages have maintained prices at 
levels attractive to farmers [15].
These results suggest that the maize 
consumers in Malawi have benefited 
from the two successive strong harvests 
and the related price declines. This 
outcome is fully consistent with 
experience in Asia [4] and suggests 
an important potential impact of 
seed and fertilizer subsidies on food 
security for the poorest households 
that are net consumers even after good 
harvests. Further research is needed to 
understand the impact of the subsidy 
on maize consumers.
Displacement of commercial sales 
by subsidized fertilizer was estimated 
at 60% in 2005–2006 and 54% in 
2006–2007 [29]. While this raised 
concerns from the business community, 
the results must be weighed against 
the net social impact of achieving 
Table 1. Malawi’s National Maize Production, Food Self-Sufficiency, and the Malawi Maize Production Index, 2000–2001 to 
2006–2007
Indicator Season
2000–2001 2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 2004–2005 2005–2006 2006–2007
National average yield (t/ha) [9] 1.18 1.05 1.28 1.05 0.76 1.59 2.04
National production (million t) [9] 1.71 1.56 1.98 1.61 1.23 2.58 3.44
Food requirement met (%) [9,49] 88 78 97 83 57 118 153
MMPI (deviation from 100%) [50] 577− 2 − 1 9 81 2
MMPI, Malawi Maize Production Index.
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national food security. Experience 
from the MVP (below), which operates 
in low-income “hunger hot-spots,” is 
revealing that commercial sales actually 
increase in the poorest areas that were 
previously unserved or underserved 
by agricultural input dealers. In time, 
stimulating agricultural productivity 
will likely increase commercial 
activity in rural areas and extend new 
opportunities for agricultural input 
suppliers.
Millennium Villages: Deepening 
and Broadening Rural Investment 
Concurrent with the implementation 
of the national input subsidy program, 
the MVP was established in Malawi. 
The MVP is an integrated rural 
development approach that supports 
public-sector investments, leading to 
increased private-sector saving and 
investments [31]. The MVP began a 
year earlier in Sauri Village in western 
Kenya, achieving average maize yields 
of over 5 t/ha, and meeting 166% 
of basic caloric requirements [31]. 
Inspired by Sauri’s early success, the 
MVP employed a similar approach 
in Malawi. A total of 11,000 farming 
households in and around the village 
of Mwandama in Zomba District were 
identified for a program of intensified 
multisectoral support beginning in the 
2005–2006 season.
During August to October 2005, 
several rounds of consultation were 
held with the Mwandama community. 
These revealed major concerns 
about food security and the ability 
to recover from the 2004–2005 crop 
failure. Women were especially vocal 
about food shortages. Despite their 
desperation, farmers expressed an 
urgent need for seed and fertilizer 
over food aid, although aid was 
also required for the worst affected 
households. However, most farmers 
in these severely affected areas did 
not even have enough money to take 
advantage of the national fertilizer 
subsidy, revealing the need to modify 
the policies of the national input 
subsidy program.
Instead of purchasing inputs at 
subsidized rates, each household in 
the Millennium Villages received 
10 kg of hybrid maize seed and the 
recommended fertilizer inputs for 
a typical smallholder farm of 0.4 ha. 
Farmers were also trained in the 
“Sasakawa” planting method advocated 
by Sasakawa Global 2000 [32], using 
closer ridge spacing (75 cm apart) 
and single seeds (25 cm apart) instead 
of the traditional method of planting 
multiple seeds 50 cm apart along the 
ridges. The main differences with the 
broader national subsidy program were 
(1) enough seed was provided to plant 
0.4 ha maize, and (2) farmers were 
not required to pay for the fertilizer 
up front. Instead, after harvest, the 
recipients were required to repay a 
portion of the input cost (around 30%) 
in kind to a school meal program to be 
implemented in their villages.
Farmers welcomed the availability of 
seed, fertilizer, and extension services. 
Aided by a better than average rainy 
season, the intervention package 
resulted in unprecedented productivity 
improvements. In Mwandama Village, 
1,000 farmers obtained an average yield 
of 6.50 t/ha—more than four times the 
officially estimated national average 
for 2005–2006. In the broader cluster 
of 11 Millennium Villages around and 
including Mwandama, 11,000 farmers 
averaged a yield of 5.18 t/ha (random 
sample of 90 fields), compared with 
a yield of 2.21 t/ha (random sample 
of 30 fields) from non-intervention 
areas (where farmers had access to the 
national subsidy program) (Table 2).
The interventions were repeated 
for the 2006–2007 season. The only 
difference was the addition of 3 kg 
groundnut seed and 2 kg pigeon pea 
seed to encourage crop diversification. 
The yields obtained in 2006–2007 
dropped sharply to 3.61 t/ha, primarily 
because of poor seed germination 
due to a two-week dry spell following 
the germinating rains. However, even 
under these circumstances, farmers in 
the Mwandama cluster gained 2.11 t/ha 
from the additional inputs (Table 2).
To estimate the relative effects of 
rainfall and inputs (here defined as the 
combination of hybrid seed, fertilizer, 
and Sasakawa plant spacing) on maize 
yields, the 2004–2005 drought-affected 
crop that received little fertilizer 
was used as a baseline. The rainfall 
effect for the 2005–2006 season was 
then estimated by comparing the 
2004–2005 yield (farmers’ estimates) 
with the 2005–2006 estimates based 
on crop cuts of fields adjacent to the 
Mwandama MVP cluster. Using this 
simple estimation technique, the 
rainfall effect is 32%. The balance of 
68% accounts for the use of improved 
inputs. The results for 2006–2007 
indicated a similar effect. Thus, in 
both years, the rainfall effect appears 
to account for 25%–32% of the yield 
increase. The balance can be attributed 
to the use of improved seed, fertilizer 
application, and related extension 
advice.
The impact of the interventions 
in the MVP undoubtedly means the 
difference between a food deficit 
experienced in “normal years” and 
a significant surplus above normal 
consumption needs, which is about 
1,000 kg/year for the average family 
farm size of 5.5 people. Older farmers 
Table 2. Partitioning the Yield Increases at Mwandama Cluster of 11,000 Farms
Time Frame and Yield Effect Yield (t/ha) Yield Increase (t/ha) % Increase Due to Rains or to Inputs
2004–2005 drought year 0.80 Not applicable Not applicable
2005–2006 effect due to good rains (low input) 2.21 1.41 32
2005–2006 effect due to inputs (hybrid seed, fertilizer, 
Sasakawa plant spacing)
Not applicable 2.97 68
2005–2006 combined effect 5.18 4.38 100
2006–2007 effect due to good rains (low input) 1.50 0.70 25
2006–2007 effect due to inputs (hybrid seed, fertilizer, 
Sasakawa plant spacing)
Not applicable 2.11 75
2006–2007 combined effect 3.61 2.81 100
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reported that they had never before 
experienced or even seen maize crops 
like these, except on nearby large 
commercial estates. 
The inclusion of the Millennium 
Villages data complements the 
experience gained from Malawi’s 
national input subsidy program. 
The results demonstrated that there 
remains a very large yield gap between 
maize yields achieved at the national 
level (even with a substantial subsidy) 
and potential yields based on whole 
farm intensified support.
Lessons Learned
Political will and action provide the 
foundation for change. The use of 
fertilizer subsidies had been actively 
discouraged by donors for two decades. 
The perceived high cost and trade-offs 
with other development investments, 
the absence of clear time-bound exit 
strategies, and difficulty targeting the 
poorest of the poor have led many 
donors to withhold their support 
to input subsidy programs. Anti-
subsidy bias was well established in 
Malawi in 2005, and there was little 
encouragement from donors for 
the Government to implement the 
program described in this essay. At the 
Africa Summit of the World Economic 
Forum in Cape Town, South Africa, 
referring to the situation in Malawi 
in 2005 and his commitment to act 
and provide input subsidies, President 
Bingu wa Mutharika said: “Enough is 
enough. I am not going to go on my 
knees to beg for food. Let us grow the 
food ourselves. And indeed we have.”
[33].
This political leadership has 
effectively buffered Malawi from the 
economically and socially destructive 
effects of the global food price 
increases of 2007 and 2008. Carryover 
stocks have meant that Malawi is no 
longer dependent on food aid and 
costly commercial imports. Importantly, 
Malawi is now the focus of international 
attention as a result of some high-
profile coverage in the international 
press [34,35]. Initially with some 
reluctance, but with increasing interest 
and engagement, several donors have 
begun to work with the Government to 
support and improve the effectiveness 
of the input subsidy program for 
smallholders.
A national-scale program of 
this urgency is feasible although 
operational challenges remain. Despite
the enormous human resource 
capacity and infrastructure challenges 
facing Malawi, this national scale 
input subsidy program has been a 
success as measured by unprecedented 
production levels. With modest 
technical and financial support from 
donors, the logistical challenges of 
reaching over 2 million smallholder 
farmers were overcome during the 
Starter Pack program (1998–1999 
and 1999–2000) [27] and again in 
2005–2006 and 2006–2007 through 
the national input subsidy program. 
A number of operational challenges 
have been identified [29] and are 
being addressed by the Government 
in redesigning the program. These 
included: delays in program design 
and implementation leading to 
delayed delivery of inputs in some 
areas; cumbersome coupon processing 
and redemption systems; the need to 
improve program information sharing 
with the intended beneficiaries and 
general public; and shortages of 
fertilizers and mismatch of coupons 
and fertilizer types in some areas. 
Two major remaining challenges are 
the absence of private agro-dealers in 
remote rural areas and limited human 
and financial capacity of government 
agencies to meet the operational 
demands of the program [29]. 
However, each year of implementation 
has resulted in design improvements 
that are now inspiring other countries 
to emulate the Malawi experience.
Knowledge exists to increase 
smallholder maize productivity and 
sharply reduce food insecurity. The 
interventions implemented are 
straightforward practices that were 
developed by Malawian researchers 
and their international partners. The 
central biological basis for productivity 
improvement is the response of maize 
to nitrogen fertilizer application. The 
widespread occurrence of nitrogen 
deficiency in Africa and the availability 
of well adapted maize varieties, both 
hybrids and OPVs, mean that Malawi’s 
experience is relevant beyond its 
borders. Importantly, these improved 
practices have been successfully applied 
by smallholders, suggesting that 
development of large-scale commercial 
farming may not be essential for the 
achievement of national or household 
food security in Africa. Indeed, 
questions may be raised as to whether 
large estates that currently occupy over 
1 million ha in Malawi are an efficient 
use of the country’s limited land 
resources.
Supporting inputs rather than output 
subsidies, such as food aid, makes 
economic sense. The results from 
the MVP showed that the provision 
of about US$60 of inputs (seed and 
fertilizer based on full unsubsidized 
cost) generated an extra 0.8 to 1.2 t 
of maize for a farmer on 0.4 ha. This 
extra food can be valued at US$140 to 
US$210 based on local prices during 
lean times (assuming US$175/t), a 
benefit to cost ratio of at least 2.3 in just 
six to nine months. While the external 
evaluation of the 2006–2007 subsidy 
program estimated a modest benefit/
cost ratio of 0.76 to 1.36 [29], the 
indirect benefits on education, health, 
and social stability were not included. 
Moreover, this financial analysis did 
not consider the future stream of 
benefits flowing from the long-term 
rural economic transformation. 
The evaluation noted that the yield 
response to inputs, and thus the benefit 
to cost ratio, can be greatly improved 
by the timely delivery and use of 
inputs and better extension advice. 
The MVP demonstrated the impact of 
more efficient input use and therefore 
provides a standard against which 
improvements in national productivity 
can be measured.
The cost of achieving food security 
is fiscally manageable and responsible. 
The budgetary allocation, representing 
less than 7% of the 2005–2006 
national budget (US$5/person/year), 
supplemented in 2006–2007 by donor 
support (less than US$1/person/
year), is a remarkably small price to 
pay for achieving national food self-
sufficiency and widespread household 
food security. By comparison, the 
cost of importing food in 2004–2005 
was US$110 million (about US$8 per 
person). Donor aid to Malawi in 2005 
was US$578 million or about US$44 per 
person [36]. On this basis, there should 
be little concern about the affordability 
of a program that has such profound 
and immediate impact on the lives 
of so many Malawians. Moreover, the 
export of surplus maize to Zimbabwe 
in 2007–2008 was estimated to generate 
over US$120 million. Nevertheless, the 
dramatic increases in fertilizer prices 
over the past 12 months require greater 
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the use of complementary approaches 
to improving soil fertility (see later 
section on Future Challenges).
Pro-poor “smart” input subsidies 
work. Under the input subsidy 
program, most beneficiaries had 
access to the same quantity of inputs, 
irrespective of farm size. This implies 
that the smaller the farm, the greater 
the effective input level on a per 
hectare basis. During the past 20 years, 
large surpluses over requirements were 
obtained in 1993, 1999, 2000, 2006, 
and 2007, all years when large-scale 
input subsidies were implemented 
(Figure 1). The bulk of these surpluses 
was generated by smallholders. These 
results should not imply that fertilizer 
subsidies benefit all poor households. 
In cases where households have little 
or no land and/or are constrained by 
labor (e.g., as a result of sickness or 
household age structure), alternative 
approaches such as social cash transfer 
programs should be considered.
Maize consumers are benefiting from 
lower prices, but future challenges 
will arise with continuing surplus 
production. The direct production and 
livelihood benefits to most smallholder 
farming households are clear. However, 
the lower maize prices following the 
2006 and 2007 harvests have likely 
improved food security for the urban 
poor and the vulnerable rural poor who 
remain net consuming households. This 
result mirrors experience from Asia’s 
Green Revolution. Notwithstanding 
the recent spike in world food prices, 
continuing surpluses will demand 
greater attention to price stabilization 
mechanisms, improved post-harvest 
management, and incentives to diversify 
beyond maize to higher returning 
crops, including perennials and non-
farm enterprises.
Future Challenges: Sustaining a 
Green Revolution in Malawi
Unreliable rainfall and climate change. 
With almost all of its smallholder 
maize dependant on rainfall, Malawi is 
particularly vulnerable to large season-
to-season variation in production. The 
returns on the fertilizer investment 
vary accordingly. The realization of 
Malawi’s Green Revolution and its 
contribution to economic growth is 
also threatened by climate change. 
The Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change highlighted the vulnerability of 
African agriculture and all who depend 
on it [37]. Agriculture in Malawi may 
be affected by shorter growing seasons 
and higher temperatures. The direct 
effects on agricultural production and 
food security will be exacerbated by 
greater exposure to malaria and other 
climate-influenced diseases that reduce 
labor productivity and employment 
opportunities.
Malawian farmers have no alternative 
but to adapt to climate change. 
Fortunately, several practical options 
for adaptation to Malawian conditions 
exist and need to be deployed as a 
matter of urgency [38]:
Water harvesting, sustainable  s
extraction of groundwater, 
conservation farming (reduced 
tillage, crop residue retention, and 
crop rotations), and improved water 
use efficiency in rainfed areas.
Expanded irrigation through  s
dams and extraction of water from 
Lake Malawi and the streams that 
feed it, subject to assessment of 
environmental impact.
Shifts toward maize varieties with  s
greater drought and heat tolerance, 
and improved pest and disease 
resistance, and corresponding 
adjustments in the national research 
agenda.
Enterprise diversification toward  s
higher value crops, value-adding, 
and off-farm employment that will 
generate income to buffer possible 
maize crop failures.
Weather forecasting and provision of  s
timely advice to farmers.
Weather-related crop insurance. s
A high priority of the Government 
of Malawi should be to design and 
implement a strategy to reduce 
rainfall-induced production variability 
and prepare farmers to adapt to 
climate change. This strategy will 
require major public investments on 
a scale comparable to those that have 
supported the national input subsidy 
program.
High fertilizer prices. Fertilizer 
prices rose dramatically in 2007 and 
2008 [39], more than doubling the 
cost of the input subsidy program 
and leading to a projected budget 
shortfall of almost US$80 million. This 
rise in fertilizer prices highlights the 
vulnerability of Malawi to international 
market prices, a situation exacerbated 
by being landlocked. With high global 
food prices, the in-country production 
of maize by smallholders, even at 
three times the 2006–2007 cost of 
production, remains a more attractive 
and politically less risky proposition 
than international maize procurement 
and reliance on food aid. 
While there is no immediate 
substitute for inorganic fertilizer, there 
may be scope to improve the efficiency 
of fertilizer use. Delayed access to seed 
and fertilizer is a recurring complaint 
of farmers in Malawi and elsewhere 
in Africa. The timing of fertilizer 
application can be improved as 
delayed application can sharply reduce 
uptake efficiency. This requires: early 
tendering, and contract signing by May 
each year; coupons to be distributed by 
early August; fertilizer and seed to be 
distributed by end of September; and 
stocks in the field to be replenished 
ahead of timely application.
The national input subsidy program 
should focus on the use of urea (46% 
nitrogen) because of its lower unit 
cost of nitrogen than the compound 
fertilizer known as 23-21-0 (which 
contains 23% nitrogen and 21% 
phosphorus). At mid-2008 prices, 
urea will cost 5% less and provide 
33% more nitrogen than the current 
mix of urea and 23-21-0. As there 
are concerns about longer-term 
phosphorus deficiency in the absence 
of phosphorus application, this 
measure should be viewed as an interim 
solution only.
Inclusion of grain legumes in crop 
rotations can bring multiple benefits 
to smallholders. Groundnut, soybean, 
beans, and pigeon pea are well 
adapted to different parts of Malawi. 
These crops provide cash income 
and improved nutrition in addition 
to providing up to 60 kg nitrogen/
ha of residual fertilizer equivalent to 
the soil [40]. A national crop legume 
promotion program is strongly 
recommended.
In the longer term, there is also 
scope to increase the contribution 
of nitrogen fixation through tree 
and shrub legumes. There is a long 
history of research on agroforestry in 
Malawi and neighboring countries in 
Southern Africa [41]. Availability of 
seed is often viewed as a constraint to 
adoption of agroforestry legumes in the 
region. One option for encouraging 
adoption is to subsidize agroforestry 
legume seed. Another is to exploit the 
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more efficient small-scale nurseries and 
seed producers [42].
Post-harvest losses. The surplus 
harvests in 2006 and 2007 have 
highlighted the need to improve post-
harvest management of grain. The 
most common cause of post-harvest 
losses in Malawi is the larger grain 
borer (Prostephanus truncatus [Horn]), 
a storage pest that was introduced with 
food aid shipments [43]. There are no 
reliable national estimates of the losses 
caused by this pest. Without chemical 
treatment, household-level losses of 
40% to 100% have been reported. 
Losses from other insect pests and rats 
are also widespread. Such losses erode 
much of the estimated net gain from 
the input subsidy program. 
The Government recognized the 
importance and urgency of this 
problem by introducing post-harvest 
chemicals and distribution of improved 
storage bins in the 2008–2009 input 
subsidy program budget. However, 
a much greater effort is needed to 
educate farmers on effective and safe 
storage techniques and to ensure that 
the needed chemicals and storage 
facilities are made available. 
The Way Forward 
After decades of food insecurity 
and recurring emergencies, the 
Government of Malawi has successfully 
implemented a national input subsidy 
program that led to major surpluses 
above national demand in 2006 
and 2007. Drawing on their core 
resources—land and labor—and with 
a determination to be self-reliant and 
free of food aid, Malawian smallholders 
demonstrated that they have the ability 
to respond to strategic material support 
and incentives in order to contribute to 
their own well-being. Notwithstanding 
pockets of yield reduction and crop 
failure due to floods and drought, 
Malawi was blessed by two relatively 
favorable rainy seasons in 2005–2006 
and 2006–2007. Some critics consider 
that Malawi was “lucky” in this 
respect. Yet, in rainfed agriculture, it 
is necessary to exploit better growing 
conditions when they arise.
Continuity of this highly cost-effective 
program is needed in order for Malawi 
to achieve its Green Revolution 
in a sustainable way. Solutions are 
still needed to address the risks of 
drought and dry spells, both through 
water management technologies 
and the spreading of financial risk. 
Improvements to fertilizer use 
efficiency and more targeted, locally 
refined recommendations need to be 
deployed. Agroforestry through the 
use of nitrogen-fixing trees is one of 
several options that can complement 
and ultimately reduce the need for 
inorganic nitrogen fertilizer. Post-
harvest losses must be sharply reduced. 
More generally, Malawi (and 
African countries like it) will require 
a firm 10- to 15-year multi-stakeholder 
commitment to support rural economic 
transformation from sub-subsistence 
farmers into diversified, small-scale 
entrepreneurs, including major 
complementary investments in health, 
nutrition, education, family planning, 
infrastructure, water, and sanitation. 
The input subsidy program must 
continue for several more years to 
meet the immediate needs for national 
and household food security, while 
longer-term investments in economic 
and social infrastructure are made. 
Any abrupt halt or downscaling of 
the subsidies, as was experienced 
by Malawi following two years of 
implementation of the Starter Pack 
program [19,27], would likely reverse 
the progress during the past three 
years and must be avoided. However, 
with food security stabilized, input 
subsidies can be gradually decreased 
and replaced by smallholder-focused 
rural credit that played an important 
role in Asia’s Green Revolution. As in 
Asia, price support through strategic 
government procurement may also be 
required to stabilize prices during times 
of bumper harvests. The new Malawi 
Growth and Development Strategy 
[44] incorporates the fundamentals of 
this agriculture-led transformation and 
should be supported.
Malawi has led the way in Africa 
in demonstrating the opportunities 
and challenges of implementing a 
national input subsidy program. With 
the impetus of recent high food prices 
and a softening of donor opposition to 
subsidies, several of Malawi’s neighbors 
(including Kenya, Rwanda, and 
Tanzania) are now studying, adapting, 
and building on this experience 
to design and implement similar 
programs for improving agricultural 
productivity. Malawi’s experience will 
continue to provide valuable lessons for 
achieving and sustaining Africa’s Green 
Revolution.
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